KEMTLS

KEMTLS is an alternative for the TLS handshake, that uses post-quantum KEMs instead of signatures for handshake authentication.

Recent & Upcoming Talks

A tale of two models: formal analysis of KEMTLS in Tamarin
Conference presentation of our KEMTLS formal analysis paper at ESORICS 2022
2022-09-27 15:00 — 15:20 DGI Byen CPH Conference Center
Slides
KEMTLS-PDK
Conference talk about KEMTLS-PDK
2021-10-07 15:15 — 16:30 Virtual
Slides
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Recent Publications

KEMTLS vs. Post-Quantum TLS: Performance on Embedded Systems
We investigate the performance of KEMTLS and PQ instantiations of TLS 1.3 on embedded devices.
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A tale of two models: formal verification of KEMTLS in Tamarin
We prove the security of KEMTLS in two Tamarin models. One mode is based on the Cremers et al. model of TLS 1.3; the other closely resembles our pen-and-paper proofs. These models allow us to analyse KEMTLS, and its extension KEMTLS-PDK from different angles.
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KEMTLS with Delayed Forward Identity Protection in (Almost) a Single Round

The recent KEMTLS protocol (Schwabe, Stebila and Wiggers,CCS’20) is a promising design for a quantum-safe TLS handshake protocol. …

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Implementing and Measuring KEMTLS
KEMTLS (CCS 2020) is a novel alternative to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshake that integrates post-quantum algorithms. It …
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More efficient post-quantum KEMTLS with pre-distributed public keys
We make KEMTLS more efficient in scenarios where the client already has the server’s long-term public key, for example through caching or because it’s pre-installed.
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